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Abstract 
In the Arab world Inter-Arab relation is characterized by power struggle between Pan-Arab nationalist military 
Officers and regional Monarchies. They poised themselves in Arab politics to change the political discourse 
prevailing in the Middle East. This Pan-Arab nationalism led to extensive interventions in the affairs of various 
states as it happened in Syria at present. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)—first Pan European 
think tank launched in October 2007, with the objective of conducting research and promoting informed debate 
across European effective and value based Foreign Policy—has prepared a very important booklet entitled as The 
Regional Struggle for Syria. This work is edited by Julian Barnes Decay and Daniel Levy, and provides insights 
in understanding the Syrian conflict and the role of regional and international players. This book is a collective 
contribution of different scholars and is divided in eight (8) chapters. 
In the Introduction, “Hegemony and Sectarianism after Iraq”, the book deals with the sectarianism which 
prevailed after Iraq invasion by US in 2003. Here the author emphasises that the Syrian Civil war patronised by 
regional players who have strong weight on the ground. Among these countries, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar 
support rebels’, while as Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah movement support Assad regime. Other players who put right 
themselves are Jordan, Kurds and Israel to gain their interests too. In this conflict Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey 
are providing arms and human support collected from different countries all over the world which resulted in 
regional clashes and bomb explosions particularly in Turkey and Lebanon. This conflict adopted the regional 
communal rivalry because rebels depend on Sunni forces while as Assad heavily depend on Shia forces. This 
polarity happened due to hegemony of some regional states after ousting Saddam from Iraq and wishes to achieve 
its goal due to rebel backing with the thought “must not lose” basis (p.8; italics mine). Much imbalance is created 
when US turned blind eye to the region and pawed way for rebels and the region became an epicentre of conflict 
and would engulf whole world as it happened in Paris Moreover Gulf States are contesting not only for broader 
regional gains (as Saudi monarchy support Salfi’s while Qatar and Turkey is playing Brotherhood Card) but also 
to overcome Iranian influence. However the resistance axis are more sound ideological  though Hamas turned its 
back to Assad but rest are gripped very tightly with each other. World powers too poised themselves into rebel 
blocs (like US, EU support rebels through Gulf States) while as Russia support Iran backed Assad regime for 
regional gains. In such turbulent conditions two joint UN-Aran League envoys for Syria, Kofi Anan and Lakhdar 
Ibrahimi proposed a regional accord through Geneva I and II paid almost nothing for long lasting solution. 
The first chapter, “The Gulf States: United against Iran and divided over Islamists”, deals with conflicting 
ideologies prevailing in the region. According to Hassan-Hassan, the Arab state, though appearing united against 
Iranian influence in the region to weaken the resistance axis, but inter Gulf State rivalry is clear among them to 
achieve regional superiority. Earlier these states tried to develop influence on Assad and motivate him politically 
but failed to achieve their divided objectives when Assad refused to bow down and used ruthless power to 
overcome rebellion by killing hundreds of protesters. These states later provided every kind of assistance to rebels 
like Qatar to groups ideologically close to Muslim Brotherhood while as Saudi’s more conservative Salfi groups 
even tried to pressure US to provide high grade weapons to rebels. Saudis particularly are pitching from 1979 to 
overcome Iranian influence in the region and for this Syrian conflict is better option. These regional forces, 
particularly Saudi Arabia, wish to overcome resistance axis influence by playing the tribal Sunni card from Iraq to 
Syria, via Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan who achieved the neutralized citizenship. They want to achieve the 
lost glory which for which Assad declared them as “Half Men” (p. 19) on their criticism to Hezbollah during 
Lebanon-Israel war. But the internal divide among the Gulf States have weaken their cause while as Assad through 
resistance Axis gained some ground. 
Chapter Two, “Iran: Syria as the first line of defence”, by Jubin Goodarzi opens with the Iranian support to 
demonstrators by declaring them Islamists against the Gulf Monarchs but changed its tune when his friend befell 
prey to uprising. While understanding the regional lore on uprising Iran assured all-out support to Assad to keep 
his regime intact For Iran, Syria is only option to surmount Israeli threat by channelizing military equipment’s to 
Hezbollah via Assad regime and to maintain pressure over Israel. 
Chapter third, “Iraq: Sunni resurgence feeds Maliki’s fears”, deals with suspicion and threat of the Sunni 
insurgency to Maliki government in Iraq. This title feeds Maliki’s fears and pushes him to support Assad who 
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remained very painful for Iraq during last decade because most of the insurgents entered in to Iraq via Syria and 
Damascus kept intentionally blind eye towards them to disturb US forces in Iraq. The author considered Maliki 
support to Assad genuine in order to minimise the Sunni insurgent pressure or to get any strong hold in Iraq. This 
suspicion was also fed by the role of Gulf States in Iraq earlier and now in Syria as commented against them in a 
dinner party by Bagdad Ambassador by saying “the same people who conspired against Iraq are now conspiring 
against Syria” (p. 34). This statement infuriated Saudi foreign Minister and was barely calmed by Syrian Foreign 
Minister. In a TV interview Noori al Maliki directly condemned states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar for 
their involvement in destabilization of Syria and Iraq. However the author highlighted the double standard of 
Maliki govt. too, who one side believes in negotiation and on the other provides full support to Assad. For Baghdad 
support to Assad is compulsion because if Sunni rebels got hold over Iraq means the dispersed Insurgent groups 
in Iraq will get strength. Moreover Maliki govt. in Iraq has concern over the double standard of CIA which fights 
as counter terrorism forces in Baghdad and provide arms to the Syrian rebels. All these concern have created 
doubts in the Iraqi govt and the situation forced Maliki to take Assad side to balance the power in the region while 
as Sunni force are fighting to topple Assad and later Baghdad to reconstitute the Sunni hegemony in the regions. 
Fourth Chapter highlights Israel’s concern over Syria. Israel is in shilly-shally position though cautious but 
couldn’t decide to actively participate or to remain only vigilant regarding any development in Syria. Under Assad 
regime its borders remain silent for many years though Assad fully backed the Hezbollah during Israel- Lebanon 
war. But for Israel, Syria is both decisive as well as uncertain due to the strategic importance and its close ties with 
Iran. Iran is the main Arms supplier to Hezbollah and Syria serves as the safe route for this cause. Israel’s is much 
worried about the fundamentalist takeover of the Syria and achievement of the high grade arms by Islamic 
fundamentalism. In Case Assad regime decline, he will necessarily supply high grade weapons to Hezbollah. In 
this regard Israel started lobbying with its allies at European foreign Ministers council (p. 43) and opposed to 
reinforce rebels with high grade weapon, such as man portable air defence system which later on may turn towards 
Israel. Moreover Israel is much worried about the delivery of S-300 missile system to Syria and threatened to strike 
in case its full delivery which is yet imprecise. In this dispute Israel’s major concern is Iran Syria relationship and 
wish that an anti–Iran and pro-West power may take over Syria which will prove helpful to dilute Hamas in to 
pro-Western alliance.  
Fifth Chapter, “Jordan: Stability at all costs”, discusses Jordanian worries which created a psychological 
warfare in Jordan. Though Jordan maintained its stability tactfully and overcame threats and huge influx of 
refugees by restricting them from mixing with its citizens. It was pressurised by Gulf States to get involved in the 
conflict seriously and get involved potently. The author highlights the worries of the Jordan due to the 
overwhelming support to Jihadi groups by regional states but offers a defecto Prime Minister Raid Hijab (p. 52) 
as an option to overcome threats and to curtail the influence of jihadi groups over Syria. Being a close ally of Israel 
Jordan came on under heavy criticism of Muslim Brotherhood for its relation with Israel. Jordan is nervous about 
collapsed Syria as coercion to its existence and they may later spill over to Jordan. For this very purpose he worked 
for peaceful negotiations between Assad regime and opposition groups. For its survival Jordan kept live a very 
strong strategic Western card as source of relief and confidence. 
Sixth Chapter, “Kurd: Between Qandil and Erbil”, deliberates upon challenges and opportunities which Kurds 
come across. The author presented a picture of uncertainty between the varying intra Kurd factions led by Jalal 
Talabani and Masoud Barzani. Jalal Talaba heads Patriotic Union of Kurdistan while as Masoud Barzani lead 
Kurdish Democratic Party. As a wave of uncertainty is prevailing in the Syria, many Syrian Kurds fell prey to 
some groups who instead to achieve a united goal some are contesting within their ranks supported by Turkey and 
Iran as earlier they were supported by Syrian against Turkey. Among these factions PKK believes on militant 
activities while as Barzani lead factions believe in peaceful and gradual solutions (P.56). Syrian Kurds believe in 
Kurdistan nationalist message espoused by the PKK being of Syrian origin. Though both the groups organized 
peace talks but they failed to achieve and will deepen polarization and differences among them. Though PKK have 
control over 5 towns but have to face 16 group alliance of Kurdish National Council. It is concluded that peace 
talks between Turkey and PKK are last option for Kurd national struggle to achieve autonomous status in Syria. 
Chapter Seven, “Lebanon: Resilience meets its Stiffest Test”, discusses the fate of Lebanon which is tied with 
Syrian conflict because, sectarian players (both Shia and Sunni blocs) have mend themselves in the crisis. Though 
government officially denounced support to any faction but offline the situation is completely different. The Sunni 
dominant population known as “March 14” a coalition put all its support to rebels. The Shia dominated March18 
coalition fully backed the Assad regime and considering their fate totally dependent on Assad regime. The 
Hezbollah Chief Hassan Nasrullah one’s said “If we do not go there to fight them, they will come here (p. 62).  
Hezbollah earlier tried to maintain a distance from the Syrian conflict but Hariri and his allies openly support to 
rebels and the arms flow through them declared an open enmity with Hezbollah to confront it. This sectarian 
division has intensified the crisis and the situation will achieve a dangerous move if Syrian conflict prolonged. 
The major cause of this deepening the gulf between them is support of Gulf States to Sunni opposition groups. 
This sectarian bipolarity and influx of refugees (counts 20% of total Population) created financial challenges to 
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the state. Sunni clergy is vehemently opposing Assad regime including Hezbollah Though Sunni opposition’s 
fighting capability is not so good to challenges to Hezbollah but will create sectarian fears in Lebanon particularly 
due bomb blasts which occurred in Hezbollah’s strong hold. 
In the Eighth Chapter, “Turkey: Goodbye to zero problems with neighbours”, the author emphasized on the 
relation of Turkey with its neighbours. The title itself seems that Turkey earlier tried to maintain good relation 
with neighbours at Zero problem design, but it changed after Arab Awakening. Earlier Turkey maintained its 
relation with Syria on priority levels and maintained close relation on all fronts especially on combined Military 
drills and free trade. After Arab uprising which engulfed Syria too, Turkey tried to persuade Assad to go for all 
out reforms to curtail public resentment to resolve crisis instead of using power. When Assad decline its proposals 
Turkey shifted to a policy of regime and its policy of zero problem with neighbours came to end. Turkey openly 
came to help the rebels particularly Free Syrian Army and maintain the headquarters in the south east of the country. 
Turkey later proposed many options which got no acceptance at international level like No Fly Zone in Syria, 
regional Quartet (Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) and failed to achieve its objectives. This regional and 
sectarian bias resulted within the country resentment as Alivites developed strong ties with Damascus and assured 
full support to Assad. This conflict caught in the middle and resulted in cold war at home and at international level 
as Turkey wishes Assad to go for ever whereas international players incline Assad role too in Syria. This conflict 
gave major setback to Turkish regional policy as it was having capacity to play a big brothers role  and may have 
negotiate  instead of favouritism. So in such turbulent conditions Turkey need to rethink over regional policy and 
manage all the challenges judiciously and address them earlier the best. 
The Arab uprisings of 2011-2012 have deepened the divisions of the new Arab cold war, including along 
Sunni-Shi’a lines. And like the earlier cold war, the contemporary one features competing approaches to 
intervention in the affairs of other Arab states. Today’s Arab cold war features only state-state rivalries, but not 
sectarian rivalry. This conflict must be viewed in political terms as a proxy war between Saudi and Iranian led 
blocs as compare to struggle between Sunni and Shi’a alliance in the region. The battle lines outside Syria are 
already drawn, with the US, Britain and France in conflict with Russia and China, while regional non-Arab powers 
Turkey and Iran similarly back opposite sides. 
 
